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A DISCOURAGING OMEN: A CRITICAL 
EVALUATION OF THE APPROVED UNIFORM 
LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS 
FOR THE FORENSIC LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 
Simon A. Cole* 
 
The theme of the 2018 Georgia State University Law Review 
symposium is the Future of Forensic Science Reform. In this Article, 
I will assess the prospects for reform through a critical evaluation of 
a document published in February 2018 by the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Approved Uniform Language for 
Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline 
(ULTR).1 I argue that this document provides reason to be concerned 
about the prospects of forensic science reform. In Part I, I discuss the 
background of the ULTR. In Part II, I undertake a critical evaluation 
of the ULTR. In the Conclusion, I discuss why the importance of the 
ULTR extends beyond merely one document and one discipline to 
implicate the future of forensic science reform more generally. 
I.   Background 
A.   ULTRs 
To understand the rationale for treating a single three-page 
document as a measure of the prospects for forensic reform, some 
background will be useful. The lack of standardization in forensic 
testimony and reporting has been an issue of consternation for some 
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 1. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPROVED UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR THE 
FORENSIC LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 1 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1037171/download 
[https://perma.cc/XGS9-95HE]. 
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time.2 This issue received official notice in 2009 when the National 
Research Council included among its recommendations for 
“strengthening forensic science in the United States” a 
recommendation to “establish standard terminology to be used in 
reporting on and testifying about the results of forensic science 
investigations.” 3  A newly created institution, the Organization of 
Scientific Area Committees (OSAC), sponsored by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, is currently trying to write 
standards for testimony and reporting in many forensic disciplines.4 
However, no such standards have yet been approved.5 
Another important development in this area that particularly 
impacted the DOJ was the 2015 release of a report on reporting 
practices by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the 
discipline of microscopic hair comparison (MHC). This report found 
that MHC was reported in a misleading manner in a stunning 95% of 
cases reviewed.6 
Largely in response to the MHC review, in February 2016 the 
Deputy Attorney General announced that the DOJ would develop 
what would later become the ULTRs, but were then called 
“Approved Scientific Standards for Testimony and Reports” 
(ASSTRs), in many forensic disciplines.7 Describing the ASSTRs, 
the Deputy Attorney General said, “We hope this effort will serve as 
a model for demonstrating our commitment to strengthening forensic 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See, e.g., Bert Black, Focus on Science, Not Checklists, 39 TRIAL 24, 26 (2003). 
 3. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 22, 189 (2009). 
 4. OSAC Approved Standards, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/organization-scientific-area-committees-osac/osac-
registry/osac-approved [https://perma.cc/M3GF-FZP4]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-
criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-
962fcfabc310_story.html?utm_term=.67f5806990fa [https://perma.cc/6EDQ-XGCP]. 
 7. Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at the 68th Annual Scientific Meeting of the 
American Academy of Forensic Science (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-
attorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-during-68th-annual-scientific [https://perma.cc/4QLB-
ABEZ] (“To address this problem [of testimonial overstatement revealed by the microscopic hair 
comparison review], the FBI is close to finalizing new internal standards for testimony and reporting—
which they’re calling ‘Approved Scientific Standards for Testimony and Reports,’ or ASSTR.”). 
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science, now and in the future.”8  The first draft documents, now 
renamed ULTRs, were published for public comment in June 2016.9 
In April 2017, the U.S. Attorney General did not renew the 
National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS).10 This was an 
important development, because the NCFS had been created in 2013 
“to provide recommendations and advice to the Department of 
Justice concerning national methods and strategies for strengthening 
the validity and reliability of the forensic sciences.”11 The Attorney 
General replaced the NCFS with a Forensic Science Working 
Group.12 In announcing this new position, the ULTRs were among 
only two specific projects mentioned that the DOJ would pursue 
“aimed at ensuring that the testimony of the Justice Department’s 
forensic examiners is consistent with sound scientific principles and 
just outcomes.”13  This was significant because the entity charged 
with producing the ULTRs is now also the entity charged with 
regulating forensic science more generally in the United States.14 
Thus, to a far greater extent than before, the content of the ULTRs 
and the process by which that content is produced will tell us a lot 
about the future of the regulation of forensic science in the United 
States. 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. 
 9. Forensic Science, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/forensic-science 
[https://perma.cc/TLK4-8GVS] (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (archived webpage). 
 10. Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Orders Justice Dept. to End Forensic Science Commission, Suspend 
Review Policy, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/sessions-orders-justice-dept-to-end-forensic-science-commission-suspend-review-
policy/2017/04/10/2dada0ca-1c96-11e7-9887-
1a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.b4648d713d41 [https://perma.cc/2FVF-7GDH]. 
 11. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RENEWED CHARTER FOR THE NAT’L COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE 
(Apr. 23, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/624216/download [https://perma.cc/7SX9-
PPYN]. 
 12. Beth Reinhard, Jeff Sessions Scuttles Forensics Partnership with Scientist, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jeff-sessions-scuttles-forensics-partnership-with-scientists-
1502148688 [https://perma.cc/R75P-SPZ3]; Press Release No. 17-0880, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. 
Affairs, Justice Department Announces Plans to Advance Forensic Science (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-plans-advance-forensic-science 
[https://perma.cc/W2ZD-Q9F4]. 
 13. Press Release No. 17-0880, supra note 12. 
 14. OSAC also regulates forensic science in the United States, but OSAC’s mandate, which is 
limited to setting standards, is much narrower than the NCFS’s mandate was. See Simon A. Cole, Who 
Will Regulate American Forensic Science?, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 566 (2018). 
3
Cole: A Discouraging Omen: A Critical Evaluation of the Approved Unifor
Published by Reading Room, 2018
1106 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
In 2018, at the annual meeting of the American Academy of 
Forensic Science, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein 
announced the DOJ’s “plans to advance forensic science.” 15  In 
fleshing out these “plans,” the DOJ’s press release listed four specific 
actions.16 First among these was the publication of the ULTR for the 
latent print discipline.17 As Rosenstein noted, the latent print ULTR 
“is the first approved Uniform Language document.”18 So, again, this 
first ULTR may tell us a lot about not only future ULTRs but also 
about the future of forensic reform. 
B.   Latent Print Reporting 
The reporting of the results of latent print analyses has been a 
vexing issue for several decades now. Historically, for more than a 
century, latent print analyses were generally reported in a rather 
simple framework. A latent print could be deemed “of value” or 
not.19 Comparing a latent print of value with a known print could 
result in one of three reports: (1) identification; (2) inconclusive; (3) 
exclusion.20 This framework is often described as categorical because 
it sorts all reports into one of three clearly delineated categories, 
which are treated as entirely distinct from one another, yet entirely 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Press Release No. 18-213, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department 
Announces Plans to Advance Forensic Science (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-announces-plans-advance-forensic-science-0 [https://perma.cc/ZJ83-CJGY]. 
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. The other three were: (1) a testimony monitoring framework; (2) plans (as yet unfulfilled) to 
publish documents such as quality management documents and internal validation studies (and, 
presumably, standard operating procedures); and (3) the rechartering of the Council of Federal Forensic 
Laboratory Directors. Id. For more on standard operation procedures in the FBI’s Latent Print Unit, see 
Simon A. Cole, Implementing Counter-Measures Against Confirmation Bias in Forensic Science, 2 J. 
APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 61, 61 (2013). 
 18. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-
remarks-american-academy-forensic-sciences [https://perma.cc/A2TP-DTRW]. 
 19. Recently, this decision has been complicated by differences between laboratories, some of which 
use an additional designation called “of value for exclusion only.” SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION 
RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECH., STANDARDS FOR EXAMINING FRICTION RIDGE IMPRESSIONS AND 
RESULTING CONCLUSIONS § 4.1.4.2 (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.swgfast.org/documents/examinations-
conclusions/130427_Examinations-Conclusions_2.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC8Y-J6EF] [hereinafter 
SWGFAST]. This issue need not concern us here. 
 20. Allyson A. Simons, Technical Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and 
Technology (TWGFAST) Guidelines, 48 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 147, 147 (1998). 
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homogeneous within. This categorical framework has been criticized 
since at least the mid-1990s.21 To avoid excess detail, the criticism 
can be summarized by two points. 
First, categorical reporting is artificial and inferior to what might 
be called continuous reporting, in which the weight of each 
individual latent print comparison is described as it is assigned, rather 
than by reference to its place in a relatively crude three-category 
framework. Categorical reporting is vulnerable to the same criticism 
that can be made of any use of categories: the artificial boundaries 
between the categories render the system prone to perverse cliff 
effects. Thus, a comparison about which the examiner is 100% 
certain 22  is reported as identification, while a comparison about 
which the same examiner is 99.9999% certain is reported as 
inconclusive. Likewise, that 99.9999% certain result yields the exact 
same report—inconclusive—as a report that is 51% certain, 1% 
certain, or 0.1% certain. 
The second criticism is that a categorical framework posits two 
entire categories as the extremes of the continuum of probability: 
identification is equivalent to a probability of one, and exclusion is 
equivalent to a probability of zero. Put another way, categorical 
reporting claims that certainty is possible. Indeed, under the 
categorical framework, positive results—that is, results that claimed 
an association between a latent print and a known print—could not 
be reported in any way but certainty. Many viewed this as violating 
what is sometimes called Cromwell’s rule, which holds that the 
probability of an event is always between zero and one but can never 
be equal to zero or one.23 
Forensic statisticians, and those who are persuaded by them, argue 
that categorical reporting frameworks distort forensic evidence by 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Christophe Champod, Edmond Locard—Numerical Standards and ‘Probable’ Identifications, 45 
J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 139, 139 (1995). It is possible to argue that figures such as Edmond 
Locard and Henry Faulds implicitly criticized the categorical framework in the early 20th century. 
 22. For purposes of illustration only, in this example I am assuming that claims to 100% certainty 
are not incoherent on their face and that the examiner’s “certainty” is an appropriate way of reporting 
the weight of evidence. 
 23. DENNIS V. LINDLEY, UNDERSTANDING UNCERTAINTY 91 (2006). 
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both overvaluing and undervaluing forensic associations. 24  In the 
case of the latent print framework, all identifications are overvalued 
by the untenable claim to a probability of one, which amounts to 
certainty. Many inconclusive outcomes are undervalued because they 
are essentially deemed to mean nothing, even if there is a finding that 
the two prints very, very likely derive from the same source. 
In place of this, forensic statisticians propose what is sometimes 
called a weight of evidence framework. In this framework, the 
examiner would report the weight of the evidence as a ratio between 
the probability of the evidence if the two prints derive from the same 
source and the probability of the evidence if the two prints derive 
from different sources. In such a framework, some value would 
always be assigned to each probability; neither probability would be 
assigned a value of zero.25 
In 2015, the U.S. Defense Forensic Science Center (DFSC) began 
reporting latent print results in a probabilistic format.26 The DFSC 
explicitly stated that it would no longer use the term identification 
because of its historical association with claims to certainty.27  In 
2015, the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes published 
a guideline recommending that forensic scientists, including latent 
print examiners, report their findings in the form of a likelihood 
ratio.28 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Cedric Neumann & Julian Champkin, Fingerprints at the Crime-Scene: Statistically Certain, or 
Probable?, SIGNIFICANCE, Feb. 2012, at 21, 25. 
 25. See, e.g., Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint 
Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101, 101 (2001); Neumann & Champkin, supra note 24, at 
21; Cedric Neumann, Statistics and Probabilities As a Means to Support Fingerprint Examination, in 
LEE AND GAENSSLEN’S ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 419, 452 (Robert Ramotowski ed., 
3d ed. 2013). 
 26. DEF. FORENSIC SCI. CTR., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INFORMATION PAPER NO. CIFS-FSL-LP, USE OF 
THE TERM “IDENTIFICATION” IN LATENT PRINT TECHNICAL REPORTS 1 (Nov. 3, 2015). 
 27. Id. 
 28. EUROPEAN NETWORK OF FORENSIC SCI. INSTS., ENFSI GUIDELINE FOR EVALUATIVE 
REPORTING IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 6 (Mar. 8, 2015), http://enfsi.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/m1_guideline.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5ZN-TSYZ]. 
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C.   The Draft ULTR for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline 
In 2016, the DOJ published sixteen draft ULTRs with supporting 
documentation for public comment.29  Numerous public comments 
were made. After the public comment period had closed, a committee 
convened by the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS) wrote a 2017 report on latent print analysis.30 This 
report considered and commented on the draft ULTR for the latent 
print discipline. 31  The public comments and the AAAS report 
criticized the latent print ULTR and its supporting documentation on 
several grounds. Below I list the criticisms of the ULTR’s definition 
of identification, which reads: 
The examiner may state or imply that an identification is 
the determination that two friction ridge prints originated 
from the same source because there is sufficient quality and 
quantity of corresponding information such that the 
examiner would not expect to see that same arrangement of 
features repeated in another source. While an identification 
to the absolute exclusion of all others is not supported by 
research, studies have shown that as more reliable features 
are found in agreement, it becomes less likely to find that 
same arrangement of features in a print from another 
source.32 
Some criticisms of this statement include the following: 
 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Forensic Science, supra note 9. 
 30. WILLIAM THOMPSON ET AL., ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., FORENSIC SCIENCE 
ASSESSMENTS: A QUALITY AND GAP ANALYSIS: LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATION (2017), 
https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/reports/Latent%20Fingerprint%20Report%20FINAL%209_14.pdf?i9xGS_EyMHnIPLG6INIUy
Zb66L5cLdlb [https://perma.cc/GPQ3-YAK4]. 
 31. Id. 
 32. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROPOSED UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR THE 
FORENSIC LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 1 (June 3, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/olp/file/861911/download [https://perma.cc/JK63-PEAD]. 
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(1) A categorical scheme allowing only three possible 
reports is too crude.33 
(2) The definition is circular.34 
(3) Replacing identification to the exclusion of all 
others (TTEOAO) with identification—or 
“minc[ing]” the term identification 35 —makes no 
scientific, logical, or linguistic difference and will 
not make any difference to lay people. The term 
identification should be replaced.36 
(4) A claim of identification is inherently a decision. A 
framework, known as decision theory, exists which 
provides a roadmap to making an identification 
decision. However, this framework is not used by 
the ULTR. Moreover, the framework would require 
the latent print examiner to have knowledge that is 
beyond the expertise of a fingerprint examiner.37 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Michele Triplett, Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports (June 
17, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-0018 
[https://perma.cc/6PDY-KVXF]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 61. 
    36.   Id. at 60; Simon A. Cole, Comment on Statements Approved for Use in Laboratory Reports by 
Expert Witnesses (July 8, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-
2016-0012-0085&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/53B8-L7UG]; Friction 
Ridge Subcomm. of the Organization of Sci. Area Comms., Comment on Proposed Uniform Language 
for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline and Supporting Documentation (July 
8, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-
0067&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/96N2-PG78]; Jessica Gabel Cino, 
Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports (July 8, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-
0102&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/BZX9-6XUP]; Innocence Project & 
Innocence Network, Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the 
Forensic Latent Print Discipline (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-
0124&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/SP7L-H82L]; Jules Epstein, Comment 
on the Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-0019 [https://perma.cc/4ZJZ-KZEB]. 
 37. Simone Gittelson, Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Forensic Latent Print 
Discipline (July 11, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-2016-
0012-0138&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/MUF9-6FFV]; see also John 
Buckleton et al., Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for the Forensic Footwear and Tire 
Impression Discipline (July 5, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-
OLP-2016-0012-0052&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/2XJM-WV54]. 
Specifically, the examiner would need to know: (1) the prior probability that the source of the known 
print is the source of the latent print; and (2) “the utility (or loss) values of correctly identifying the 
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(5) The definition of identification is ambiguous as to 
whether it is intended to express certainty or 
uncertainty. If it is intended to express certainty, it 
violates Cromwell’s rule.38 
(6) If the definition of identification is intended to 
express uncertainty, hedging with the term expect 
does not solve the problem.39 
(7) There is no scientific support for the claim that 
latent print examiners can tell when they are in a 
situation in which they can distinguish same-source 
and different-source pairings40—or, to put it another 
way, that they can precisely estimate the rarity of 
features observed in a latent print.41 
                                                                                                                 
questioned impression, correctly not identifying the questioned impression, incorrectly identifying the 
questioned impression and incorrectly not identifying the questioned impression.” Gittelson, supra. For 
more on this issue, see infra Part II.B.2.b)(1). 
 38. Cole, supra note 36; Friction Ridge Subcomm. of the Organization of Sci. Area Comms., supra 
note 36; Cino, supra note 36; Epstein, supra note 36. 
 39. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 62 (“We disagree . . . with the language that the DOJ 
suggests that examiners use. In our view, the DOJ’s proposed language is . . . scientifically unwarranted. 
Under the DOJ proposal examiners are forbidden from saying that the arrangement of features found in 
a latent print and in a matching exemplar would not be repeated in another source, as that statement 
would constitute the forbidden and unsupportable claim that the two friction ridge impressions 
originated from the same source to the exclusion of all others. But examiners are allowed to say that 
they ‘would not expect to see that same arrangement of features repeated in another source.’ Examiners 
are thus allowed to make an assertion that is deemed scientifically unsupportable and improper so long 
as they hedge by saying that they ‘expect’ that the assertion is true rather than saying outright that it is 
true.”) (emphasis omitted). See also Letter from Rush D. Holt, Chief Exec. Officer, Am. Ass’n for the 
Advancement of Sci., to Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Mar. 26, 2018) 
(on file with Georgia State University Law Review). 
 40. Cole, supra note 36 (“There is no scientific support for the claim that any method of latent print 
analysis . . . enables . . . a latent print examiner . . . to ascertain that the amount of corresponding friction 
ridge features that they perceive always derive from same-source pairings and never derive from 
different-source pairings.”). 
 41. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 63 (“The problem with the DOJ’s proposed reporting 
language, then, is that there is no scientific evidence—none whatsoever—that latent print examiners 
have the ability to estimate with the required level of precision the frequency of the feature sets 
observable in latent prints in the human population. Because there is no proof that they can make such 
precise judgments accurately, there is no reason to believe that conclusions resting on their ability to 
make such precise judgments will be reliable or valid. Consequently, assertions about the probability 
that a feature set observed in a latent print will be repeated in another source are unwarranted. In our 
view, latent print examiners should not be making such statements.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Comment on 
Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports (June 29, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-
0046&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/7J23-K3EL]; Steve Lund & Hari Iyer, 
9
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II.   The Approved ULTR for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline 
The newly approved and published ULTR has done little to 
address the criticisms above. Below, I discuss several continuing 
problems with the approved ULTR. 
A.   Process Issues 
1.   Absence of Supporting Documentation 
The above criticism notwithstanding, the draft ULTRs were 
accompanied by longer documents titled Supporting 
Documentation.42 These documents enabled greater understanding of 
the draft ULTRs’ intended meaning, especially when the ULTRs 
were confusing, self-contradictory, or ambiguous. The approved 
ULTR for the latent print discipline contains no such supporting 
documentation. This makes it more difficult to understand the 
ULTR’s intended meaning when, as discussed below, it is unclear, 
self-contradictory, or ambiguous. If the latent print ULTR is 
establishing a precedent for the others, this does not bode well for 
clarity and transparency. 
2.   Absence of Public Comment (and Failure to Respond to 
Original Public Comment) 
In announcing the ULTRs (then called ASSTRs), the DOJ stated 
that it planned to “invite feedback from the broader forensic 
community.” 43  The draft ULTRs were published in the Federal 
Register for public comment.44 There were 127 comments made.45 
                                                                                                                 
Comment on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print 
Discipline (July 11, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012-0141 
[https://perma.cc/7GMF-3S24]. For more on this issue, see infra Part II.B.2(b). 
 42. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION FOR DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROPOSED 
UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR THE FORENSIC LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 1 
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/olp/file/861906/download [https://perma.cc/P5LN-X72Z]. 
 43. Yates, supra note 7. 
 44. Notice of Public Comment Period on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports, 
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The comments on the latent print ULTR raised serious concerns. 
While we cannot assume the commenters were always correct, the 
process of responding to the public comments would have challenged 
the DOJ to consider the criticisms of current practice being made by 
the scientific community outside the DOJ. 
Public comments on all documents published by the NCFS were 
adjudicated.46 The public comments on the draft ULTRs were never 
adjudicated. Instead the process was simply restarted, and the 
“approved” ULTR was published without public comment. 47  The 
DOJ has asserted that the latent print ULTR “was peer-reviewed by 
experts outside of the Department, and their comments helped inform 
the approved language” through a “National Institute of Justice-
facilitated peer review process.”48 This is less transparent than the 
previous ULTR adjudication process. 
B.   Substantive Issues 
1.   Categorical Reporting 
The ULTR remains a categorical reporting framework with three 
categories: identification, inconclusive, and exclusion.49 Categorical 
reporting is problematic for the reasons discussed above. 50  The 
ULTR offers no explanation as to how it reconciles the well-known 
problems with categorical reporting. 
As noted above, a categorical framework that includes a category 
called identification constitutes a claim to certainty that two prints 
                                                                                                                 
81 Fed. Reg. 48462 (July 25, 2016). 
 45. Notice of Public Comment Period on Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports, 
REGULATIONS.GOV (July 8, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po=25&dct=P
S&D=DOJ-OLP-2016-0012 [https://perma.cc/6Y9A-LBDF]. 
 46. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., GUIDANCE FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF PUBLIC COMMENTS, 
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/788186/download [https://perma.cc/WSR5-N95A] (last updated June 
1, 2017). 
 47. Rosenstein, supra note 18. 
 48. Id.; Letter from Ted Hunt, Senior Advisor on Forensic Sci., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Jules 
Epstein, Professor of Law and Dir. of Advocacy Programs, Temple Univ. Beasley Sch. of Law (Apr. 20, 
2018) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review). 
 49. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 50. See supra Part I.B. 
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derive from the same source. The ULTR states: “‘Source 
identification’ is an examiner’s conclusion that two friction ridge 
skin impressions originated from the same source.”51  Put another 
way, identification constitutes a claim that the potential donor pool of 
a latent print has been reduced from all the friction ridge skin in the 
universe to a single area of skin. 
Such strong conclusions have been described as scientifically 
unsupportable by numerous authorities, including official reports52 
and scholars. 53  The ULTR proposes that federal latent print 
                                                                                                                 
 51. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 52. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 140, 
142 (2009); MELISSA K. TAYLOR ET AL., NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., LATENT PRINT 
EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS APPROACH 8 
(2012); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL 
COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 101 (Sept. 2016); 
ANTHONY CAMPBELL, THE FINGERPRINT INQUIRY REPORT 740 (2011); THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 
30, at 13–16. 
 53. See, e.g., David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize Using Statistics?, 
31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC’Y 197, 197 (1991); Champod & Evett, supra note 25, at 113; Didier Meuwly, 
Forensic Individualisation from Biometric Data, 46 SCI. & JUST. 205, 207 (2006); Jennifer L. Mnookin, 
The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. 
PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 131 (2008); Ton Broeders, Of Earprints, Fingerprints, Scent Dogs, Cot 
Deaths and Cognitive Contamination—A Brief Look at the Present State of Play in the Forensic Arena, 
159 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 148, 154–55 (2005); see generally Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: 
Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1189, 1197 (2004); KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS: 
THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 56 (2000); Bernard W.N. Robertson, Fingerprints, Relevance 
and Admissibility, 2 N.Z. RECENT L. REV. 252, 255–56 (1990); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, 
The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 204 (2008); Quon 
Yin Kwan, Inference of Identity of Source (June 16, 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of California, Berkeley) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review); John I. Thornton & Joseph 
L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification: Statistical Basis for 
Evidence Evaluation, in 4 MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE § 29:46 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2017–2018 ed.); 
Alex Biedermann et al., Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification: Underlying Logic and 
Argumentative Implications, 177 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 120, 120–21 (2008) [hereinafter Biedermann, 
Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification]; James E. Starrs, Judicial Control Over 
Scientific Supermen: Fingerprint Experts and Others Who Exceed the Bounds, 35 CRIM. L. BULL. 234, 
234 (1999); David H. Kaye, Beyond Uniqueness: The Birthday Paradox, Source Attribution and 
Individualization in Forensic Science Testimony, 12 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 3, 8–9 (2013); Jonathan 
Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 
BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (2010); Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions 
Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 
233, 234 (2009); Mark Page et al., Uniqueness in the Forensic Identification Sciences—Fact or 
Fiction?, 206 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 12, 13 (2011); Christophe Champod, Fingerprint Examination: 
Towards More Transparency, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 111, 111–12 (2008); see D. Michael Risinger 
& Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification 
Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 38 (1996); Max M. Houck, Intellectual Infrastructure: A Modest 
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examiners continue to report in terms of certainty, despite these 
numerous authorities stating such claims are unsupportable. 
2.   Basis for a Categorical Report of Source Identification 
Given the widespread critiques of categorical reports as 
unsupportable, one would expect the ULTR to explain how it claims 
to support such a report. The ULTR offers three explanations: 
 
(1) This conclusion is an examiner’s decision that the 
observed friction ridge skin features are in sufficient 
correspondence such that the examiner would not 
expect to see the same arrangement of features 
repeated in an impression that came from a different 
source and insufficient friction ridge skin features in 
disagreement to conclude that the impressions came 
from different sources. 
(2) The basis for a ‘source identification’ conclusion is 
an examiner’s decision that the observed 
corresponding friction ridge skin features provide 
extremely strong support for the proposition that the 
two impressions came from the same source and 
extremely weak support for the proposition that the 
two impressions came from different sources. 
(3) A source identification is a statement of an 
examiner’s belief (an inductive inference) that the 
                                                                                                                 
Critique of Forensic Science, 53 SCI. & JUST. 1, 1 (2013); Antonio Amorim, Opening the DNA Black 
Box: Demythologizing Forensic Genetics, 31 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 259, 263–65 (2012); Alex 
Biedermann et al., The Subjectivist Interpretation of Probability and the Problem of Individualisation in 
Forensic Science, 53 SCI. & JUST. 192, 193–94 (2013) [hereinafter Biedermann, Subjectivist 
Interpretation]; Pierre Margot, Forensic Science on Trial—What Is the Law of the Land?, 43 
AUSTRALIAN J. FORENSIC SCIS. 89, 95 (2011); Simon A. Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live 
Individualization! Reforms of Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, 13 L. 
PROBABILITY & RISK 117, 117 (2014). See also Letter from Madeline H. deLone, Exec. Dir., Innocence 
Project, to Ted Hunt, Senior Forensic Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Kira Antell, Senior Counsel, 
Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Mar. 22, 2018) (on file with Georgia State University Law 
Review). 
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probability that the two impressions were made by 
different sources is so small that it is negligible.54 
 
All three statements say more or less the same thing in different 
words. In general, they draw on the language of probabilistic 
reasoning. Probabilistic approaches have gained increasing influence 
within forensic science because they claim to offer a more logical 
approach than the sort of nonprobabilistic categorical reporting 
described above.55 Forensic statisticians argue that all forensics can 
and should be reported in a probabilistic manner.56 
As forensic statisticians would advise, the ULTR sets up latent 
print analysis as a probabilistic problem that begins with the 
formation of two exhaustive and mutually exclusive hypotheses: (1) 
the two prints come from the same source; or (2) they come from 
different sources. So, the ULTR sets the problem up correctly. Then 
it says that the DOJ examiner should report a “source identification” 
when the probability of the different source hypothesis is 
“negligible,” “extremely weak[ly]” supported, or unexpected.57 The 
problem with this approach can be summed up by two key points. 
a.   Making a Claim to Certainty by Rounding a Small 
Probability to a Zero Probability 
As noted in the previous section, the ULTR suggests that latent 
print examiners report to the fact finder “that two friction ridge skin 
impressions originated from the same source.”58 This statement is 
equivalent to reporting to the fact finder that there is zero probability 
that two friction ridge impressions originated from different sources. 
However, the ULTR then goes on to say that the basis for this 
testimony is not that there is zero probability that two friction ridge 
                                                                                                                 
 54. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 55. See, e.g., COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE 
FOR FORENSIC SCIENTSTS 16–17 (2005); BERNARD ROBERTSON ET AL., INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: 
EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 55 (2016). 
 56. See, e.g., AITKEN & TARONI, supra note 55, at 17; ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 55. 
 57. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 58. Id. 
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impressions originated from different sources, but rather that this 
probability “is so small that it is negligible.”59 
This reasoning is problematic for several reasons. First, the ULTR 
is self-contradictory. At first, it says that the examiner should report 
to the fact finder that there is zero probability that two prints 
originate from different sources.60 Then, it states that this probability 
is not zero. 61  In short, the ULTR uses probabilistic reasoning to 
support a nonprobabilistic statement. This contradicts the whole 
rationale of a probabilistic approach, which is to try to understand—
and perhaps quantify—the uncertainty surrounding particular 
propositions. 
Perhaps the ULTR is saying that the probability is not in fact zero, 
but merely that the fact finder should be told that it is zero. In other 
words, the ULTR proposes to round a statement of uncertainty into a 
statement of certainty for the fact finder’s consumption. What is the 
justification for this rounding? Why is it preferable to report the 
rounded probability to the fact finder, rather than reporting the “true 
probability”? Why is the rounding being done in the direction that 
favors the state, rather than the defendant? The ULTR does not 
address these questions. 
Forensic statisticians take a dim view of this rounding, as we know 
from the comments on the draft ULTR.62 Forensic statisticians note 
that it “seems sensible to require that probabilities reported by 
scientists correspond to their actual personal beliefs.”63 They suggest 
“[t]his view can be supported on a number of . . . grounds, including 
common sense, ethics, epistemology, and legal requirements that 
experts do not testify beyond their realm of expertise.”64 But they 
have also formally demonstrated the intuitive point that reporting the 
probability you believe to be accurate is a better decision than 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See supra Part I.C.; see also Biedermann, Subjectivist Interpretation, supra note 53, at 193 
(describing “the malpractice of rounding off small probabilities of actual belief to a zero reported 
belief”). 
 63. Biedermann, Subjectivist Interpretation, supra note 53, at 198. 
 64. Id. 
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reporting a rounded version of that probability. As they dryly note, 
“It is thus in the scientist’s interest to report his actual belief.”65 
Second, the latent print community had been trying to verbally 
characterize the probability that two friction ridge impressions 
originated from different sources using words like “negligible,” 
“vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” “minimal,” and 
“microscopic” for some years now.66 The questions remain the same 
today as they have always been: What quantity is it that is being 
verbally characterized as negligible? Why is a word being used rather 
than the quantity itself? The answer, of course, is that there is no 
quantity. DOJ latent print examiners cannot calculate or estimate the 
probability that two friction ridge impressions originated from 
different sources, so they are simply declaring it to be extremely 
small ipse dixit. The ULTR adopts this argument even though some 
progress is being made toward quantifying probabilities for latent 
print associations.67 Indeed, one U.S. laboratory, the DFSC, is now 
reporting the results of latent print analyses using calculated 
probabilities.68 Thus, while the DFSC is actively trying to quantify 
probabilities, the DOJ is advising examiners who have not tried to 
quantify probabilities to tell the fact finder that they are negligible. 
These arguments against rounding probabilities have been in the 
literature for some time. The ULTR evinces no awareness of them 
and offers no response to them. 
b.   The ULTR Offers No Evidence That Examiners Can 
Determine the Source of a Latent Print with Certainty 
The ULTR appears to assume that latent print examiners can 
accurately and responsibly determine, estimate, or assign the relative 
probability of the evidence under two hypotheses. It does not suggest 
or claim they do so through measurements or data. Indeed, it does not 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 196. 
 66. Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1048 (2007). 
 67. E.g., Cedric Neumann et al., Quantifying the Weight of Evidence from a Forensic Fingerprint 
Comparison: A New Paradigm, 175 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y: SERIES A 371, 372 (2012). 
 68. DEF. FORENSIC SCI. CTR., supra note 26. 
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explain how they reach these probabilities at all. We can assume, 
then, they expect examiners to determine these probabilities through 
training and experience alone. As the AAAS observed, “there is no 
scientific evidence—none whatsoever—that latent print examiners 
have the ability to estimate with the required level of precision the 
frequency of the feature sets observable in latent prints in the human 
population.” 69  Even though the AAAS made these comments in 
response to the draft ULTR, 70  the approved ULTR offers no 
scientific evidence to refute the AAAS claim about the lack of 
scientific evidence. 
   i.   Decision 
One odd possible response to the above critique might be that the 
ULTR is not actually claiming that examiners have any particular 
ability to correctly discern the probability of the evidence if the prints 
come from the same source or different sources. After all, the ULTR 
says a source identification conclusion is “an examiner’s decision” 
about the probability of observing features depending on whether 
they come from the same source or different source.71 
Decision? The normal English usage of the word decision 
connotes free will and choice.72 There is no requirement inherent in 
the word that decisions be rational, evidence-based, data-driven, 
informed, or well warranted. Any of us can make a good or bad 
decision, but we can decide whatever we damn well want. This 
contrasts with, for example, the word determination—a word which 
was deleted from the draft ULTR73—which does connote that it is 
“ascertained, as after observation or investigation,” rather than 
merely chosen.74 
                                                                                                                 
 69. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 63. See also Letter from Rush D. Holt, supra note 39. 
 70. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 94. 
 71. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 72. See Decision, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2018). 
 73. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 12. 
 74. Determination, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/determination?s=t 
[https://perma.cc/3CX4-ZJ47] (last visited Mar. 29, 2018). 
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Could the ULTR be suggesting that DOJ latent print examiners 
can simply decide on the probability of the same source hypothesis 
based on a whim with no evidence whatsoever? It seems unlikely that 
is what was intended. But why then replace “determination” with 
“decision”? The explanation probably lies in the odd recent history of 
the use of the word decision in the latent print discipline. Some 
explication of that context is necessary.75 
Beginning in 2008, a group of forensic scientists and statisticians 
published a series of papers advocating the application of decision 
theory to forensic identification.76 Although their arguments have by 
no means been universally embraced, their influence can be 
discerned in the increasingly common characterization of latent print 
identifications as “decisions,” rather than as opinions, conclusions, or 
determinations.77 This trend culminated with the Scientific Working 
Group on Friction Ridge Analysis and Technology (SWGFAST) 
replacing the word conclusion with the word decision in 2011.78 
Since then, it has become unsurprising, if not altogether common, to 
hear reference to “identification decisions” regarding latent prints. 
It is difficult to avoid thinking that the ULTR’s use of the word 
decision represents a desire to join this trend. But what is striking is 
how different the ULTR’s use of the word decision is from the 
word’s use in decision theory and even from the SWGFAST’s usage. 
In decision theory, the decision is the end-point of the reasoning 
process.79 The SWGFAST defined identification as a “decision.”80 In 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra note 53, at 130. 
For greater detail, see Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live Individualization! Reforms of 
Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, supra note 53. 
 76. See Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra note 53, at 121. 
See also Alex Biedermann et al., The Decisionalization of Individualization, 266 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 
29, 29–38 (2016). 
 77. See Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra note 53, at 
120–21. 
 78. SWGFAST, supra note 19, at § 4.3.2.1. 
 79. The following, in lay terms, is how decision theory is supposed to work. The final stage of a 
forensic analysis is a decision—that is, not an arrival at some sort of definitive truth, but, rather, a 
decision to behave as if one or the other version of events is the truth. For example, one might decide to 
behave as if it will rain, and bring one’s umbrella, or one might decide to behave as if it will not rain and 
leave one’s at umbrella home. Likewise, one might decide to behave as if the defendant is guilty and 
execute him, or one might decide to behave as if he is innocent and set him free amongst us. In both 
cases, we do not know the truth, but we must (eventually) behave as if we do. Decision theory is a 
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the ULTR, the conclusion is the end-point of the reasoning process. 
Decisions are treated as the “basis” of that conclusion.81 It is unclear 
what this is supposed to mean. The word decision is used in the 
ULTR where one would expect to see a word like perhaps 
measurement, analysis, estimate, reasoning, argument, data, or 
evidence. For example, the ULTR suggests that an important 
question is whether “the observed friction ridge skin features are in 
sufficient correspondence such that the examiner would not expect to 
see the same arrangement of features repeated in an impression that 
came from a different source.”82 But the ULTR does not suggest that 
the examiner determine this, assess it, measure it, or analyze it. 
Rather, it suggests the examiner “decide” it.83 But, as noted above, a 
decision (in the vernacular sense) can be entirely a matter of will or 
preference and requires no rational or evidential basis. 
In this sense, the ULTR is entirely inconsistent with decision 
theory and indeed with any system of reasoning that makes any 
sense. It suggests that examiners make a series of “decisions” about 
probabilities and then base a categorical conclusion on those 
decisions. This essentially turns decision theory on its head. Decision 
theory is intended to be a way to use a series of probabilities—which 
are reached through some sort of calculations and/or reasoning 
process—to make a final “decision” about how to behave under 
conditions of uncertainty.84 The ULTR proposes to make a series of 
                                                                                                                 
framework for choosing one of these two behaviors by weighing both: (1) the probabilities of being 
right or wrong (i.e., about it raining or it not raining); and (2) the consequences of right and wrong 
decisions (e.g., getting wet or unnecessarily carrying one’s umbrella). 
The point, as applied to forensic problems, was that the desired end-points—same source or different 
source—were not determinations or even conclusions but decisions. One can never know for sure 
whether two prints are in fact from the same source or different source. But one can—and sometimes 
must—decide to behave as if one or the other is true. And, importantly, the decision must necessarily be 
informed not merely by the risk of error but also by the decision-maker’s preferences regarding the 
consequences of error. Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra 
note 53, at 121. 
 80. SWGFAST, supra note 19, at § 4.3.2.1. 
 81. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Biedermann, Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification, supra note 53, at 121–22. 
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decisions about probabilities and use them to make a categorical 
conclusion. 
The final irony is that the decision theory papers in forensic 
statistics were intended to demonstrate why forensic examiners 
should not report categorical conclusions such as, for example: “these 
two prints came from the same source.” Decision theorists argue that 
reporting a categorical conclusion requires that some judgment be 
made—even if only implicitly—about the decision-maker’s 
preferences regarding the consequences of the available decisions.85 
Since it is not the expert’s place to impose her preferences upon 
either the fact-finder or society as a whole, the expert cannot proceed 
to make the final decision without inquiring into the preferences of 
the fact-finder or society. This is yet another reason why categorical 
reports by forensic experts are ill-advised. If the ULTR is, in its use 
of the term decision, trying to invoke decision theory to support its 
advocacy for categorical reporting, that would be enrolling decision 
theory in a project which it intended to oppose. 
In short, if decision is meant in a purely vernacular sense, then the 
ULTR is taking the curious position that latent print source 
identification conclusions are simply expressions of will or choice on 
the part of DOJ examiners. If, on the other hand, decision is intended 
to invoke the technical concept called decision theory, then the 
ULTR has misused the term. 
3.   False Concessions 
The ULTR ends with a section devoted to “Qualifications and 
Limitations of Latent Print Comparison Conclusions.”86 The section 
lists five things that DOJ latent print examiners should not say.87 It is 
useful to have these statements on record because, in some cases, 
these are statements that the DOJ did say for many years. For 
example, the ULTR says that DOJ examiners should not say latent 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 120. 
 86. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 87. Id. 
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print examination “has a zero error rate” or is 100% certain.88 This is 
important because FBI latent print examiners did say both of those 
things for many years.89 Most significantly, they said them in the 
early admissibility hearings challenging latent print evidence under 
Daubert.90 Essentially, the entire structure of precedents supporting 
the admissibility of latent print evidence under Daubert rests upon 
this now-disavowed claim. 
While this list of “no-nos” does demonstrate progress in the DOJ’s 
thinking, to some extent the DOJ is merely ratifying decisions that 
have already been made by others. The International Association for 
Identification, the leading professional organization for identification 
professionals, banned claims of “zero error rate,” 100% certainty, and 
infallibility nine years ago.91 But the more important issue is that this 
section consists of what I would call false concessions. By this I 
mean that the prohibition of these statements gives an appearance of 
progress, of compromise, of meeting forensic statisticians halfway. 
But that appearance is false because, in fact, prohibiting the five 
forbidden statements leaves the examiner’s report logically 
unchanged. 
a.   TTEOAOS 
Perhaps the most egregious of these false concessions is the 
provision that DOJ examiners “not assert that two friction ridge 
impressions originated from the same source to the exclusion of all 
other sources.”92 As noted above, the ULTR has already stated that 
examiners should assert “that two friction ridge skin impressions 
originated from the same source.”93 We can deduce, then, that the 
ULTR is merely objecting to the seven words: “to the exclusion of all 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. Cole, supra note 66, at 1034–35. 
 90. E.g., United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (describing the 
“breathtaking” claim that the error rate is zero). 
 91. Memorandum from Robert J. Garrett, President, Int’l Ass’n for Identification (IAI), to the IAI 
Members (Feb. 19, 2009), https://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/nas_memo_20090219.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YB3H-96T4]. 
 92. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 93. Id. 
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other sources” (TTEOAOS). However, there is no logical difference 
between the following two statements: (1) the defendant is the source 
of the print, and (2) the defendant is the source of the print 
TTEOAOS. Thus, this is a false concession because it appears to 
reform forensic science by prohibiting a “bad” phrase, but it in fact 
leaves the report to the fact-finder logically unchanged. 
This argument was made in response to the draft ULTR. As the 
OSAC Friction Ridge Subcommittee public comment noted: 
Other commentators have already noted that the mere 
removal of the words “to the exclusion of all others” does 
not remove their implication and that the implication is 
inappropriate. If a statement is made that “two friction 
ridge prints originated from the same source,” then de 
facto, they could not have been made by any other source. 
By using the exact same language in the proposed 
allowable language and unallowable language with the 
exception of those few words, unnecessary confusion may 
be introduced, as the two phrases say the exact same thing, 
with the exception that in one the exclusion of all others is 
explicitly stated, and in the other, it is merely implied.94 
The ULTR evinces no awareness of this argument and offers no 
response to it. Instead, the ULTR appears to justify the distinction 
between saying “same source” with or without TTEOAOS with the 
argument that TTEOAOS “may wrongly imply that a source 
identification is based upon a statistically-derived or verified 
measurement or comparison of all friction ridge skin impression 
features in the world’s population, rather than an examiner’s expert 
conclusion.”95 It is unclear why the ULTR holds that TTEOAOS 
implies this statement in a way that “same source” does not.96 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Friction Ridge Subcomm. of the Organization of Sci. Area Comms., supra note 36, at 1–2. 
 95. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 96. Id. In fact, the ULTR is unclear whether it intends this statement to apply to TTEOAOS or to 
“individualization” or to both. The ULTR prohibits both TTEOAOS and the term “individualization” 
and then says, “[t]his may wrongly imply that a source identification is based upon a statistically-
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b.   100% Certainty 
The same may be said for banning the term 100% certainty. The 
ULTR advocates that DOJ examiners report: two prints come from 
the same source.97 But it bans them from reporting: two prints come 
from the same source with 100% certainty. 98  But what is the 
difference? 
c.   Individualization 
The same may be said about the ULTR banning the term 
individualization. Again, it appears that the ULTR is reforming 
forensic science by banning a bad phrase. But the UTLR advocates 
the use of the term identification. 99  Left unsaid is the fact that 
individualization and identification mean exactly the same thing in 
the latent print discipline and in forensic science generally.100 As 
previously discussed, individualization and identification are treated 
as synonyms in numerous SWGFAST documents.101 It is true that 
some in the latent print community have tried to distinguish the terms 
and assign identification a new meaning, which is essentially “near 
certainty that someone is the source of a latent print.”102 As has been 
                                                                                                                 
derived or verified measurement or comparison of all friction ridge skin impression features in the 
world’s population, rather than an examiner’s expert conclusion.” Id. In any case, the statement is no 
more plausible an explanation of how individualization differs from identification than it is for how 
same source with “to the exclusion of all others” differs from same source without it. See discussion 
infra Part II.B.3(c). 
 97. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 98. Id. at 3. 
 99. Id. at 2. 
 100. See Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live Individualization! Reforms of Reporting 
Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, supra note 53, at 117. See also Letter from 
Madeline H. deLone, supra note 53. 
 101. SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECH., FRICTION RIDGE 
EXAMINATION METHODOLOGY FOR LATENT PRINT EXAMINERS § 3.3.1 (Aug. 22, 2002), 
http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/methodology/100506-Methodology-Reformatted-1.01-
Archived.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5AN-285H]; SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS 
STUDY & TECH, GLOSSARY 10–12 (Sept. 9, 2003), 
http://www.clpex.com/swgfast/documents/glossary/030909_Glossary-Consolidated_ver_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WWZ4-UJWK]; SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECH., 
STANDARDS FOR CONCLUSIONS § 1 (Sept. 11, 2003), 
http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/conclusions/030911_Standards_Conclusions_1.0-Archived.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DTK9-XZMR]. 
 102. See Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live Individualization! Reforms of Reporting 
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noted, however, the problem with such efforts is that the word 
identification has a plain English meaning plus decades of use in 
forensic science to mean same source.103 Neither the discipline nor 
the DOJ can credibly attempt to simply assign new meaning to a 
word and expect the word to be understood that way by fact-finders 
or by practitioners.104 
If the reader still has any residual uncertainty about whether the 
word identification does mean the reduction of the potential donor 
pool to a single source in the forensic community, they need only 
look to an article freshly published by the DOJ itself. The authors, 
including the Director of the National Institute of Justice Office of 
Investigative and Forensic Services, write that when forensic 
examiners “mean that the items being compared share a common 
source . . . the examiner will typically assert that he or she has 
‘identified’ a questioned item as originating from a known source.”105 
Similarly, the newly posted OSAC Lexicon defines identification, 
regarding the friction ridge discipline, as follows: “See 
individualization.”106 Individualization, in turn, is defined as “[t]he 
determination by an examiner that there is sufficient quality and 
quantity of detail in agreement to conclude that two friction ridge 
impressions originated from the same source.” 107  Finally, as an 
anecdotal illustration of the state-of-the-art in forensic practice, 
consider the standard operating procedure of the latent print unit of 
the largest police department in the United States, the New York 
Police Department, which gives identical definitions for 
identification and individualization.108 
                                                                                                                 
Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United States, supra note 53, at 117. 
 103. Henry J. Swofford & Jessica Gabel Cino, Lay Understanding of ‘Identification’: How Jurors 
Interpret Forensic Identification Testimony, 68 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 29, 31 (2018). 
 104. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 52, at 73. 
 105. Danielle Weiss & Gerald LaPorte, Uncertainty Ahead: A Shift in How Federal Scientific Experts 
Can Testify, 279 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. (2018), https://www.nij.gov/journals/279/Pages/a-shift-in-how-
federal-scientific-experts-can-testify.aspx [https://perma.cc/E573-CRDW]. 
 106. SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECH., DOC. NO. 19, STANDARD 
TERMINOLOGY OF FRICTION RIDGE EXAMINATION (LATENT/TENPRINT) 5 (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/terminology/121124_Standard-Terminology_4.0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/48RU-PTJL]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, LATENT PRINT SECTION STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL, 
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Therefore, banning the word individualization is another false 
concession. One word is banned, but another word, with the same 
meaning, is still permitted. And, that word is still defined as “same 
source.”109 
The argument that individualization is synonymous with 
identification has been in the literature for some time.110 The ULTR 
evinces no awareness of it and offers no response to it, other than the 
statement about verified measurement noted above.111 
CONCLUSION 
In this Symposium, we were asked to reflect upon the future of 
forensic science reform. The latent print discipline is an important—
and iconic—forensic discipline, and the ULTR is an important—and 
long-awaited—document. The approved ULTR is disappointing in 
the degree to which it moves the latent print discipline in the United 
States forward. It retains categorical reporting. At the same time, it 
seems to contradict itself by elsewhere suggesting that source 
identification conclusions are somewhat less than categorical. It 
retains the word identification which clearly connotes categorical 
reporting, while simultaneously resurrecting the tired strategy of 
trying to redefine the word by fiat to make its use less logically 
objectionable. It proposes that DOJ examiners estimate the rarity of 
arrangements of friction ridges in order to assign probabilities absent 
any evidence that that they can do any such thing. It proposes to rest 
a nonprobabilistic conclusion on probabilistic reasoning, and it 
proposes to rest a “conclusion” on a series of “decisions.” Finally, in 
its false concessions, it dangerously perpetuates within the latent 
print community the misleading notion that categorical reporting is 
perfectly acceptable as long as certain prohibited statements like 
                                                                                                                 
PROCEDURE #24: DEFINITIONS 4 (July 10, 2015) (on file with the Georgia State University Law 
Review). The common definition is: “The determination of an examiner that there is sufficient quality 
and quantity of detail in agreement to conclude that two friction ridge impressions originated from the 
same source.” Id. 
 109. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 2. 
 110. See Friction Ridge Subcomm. of the Organization of Sci. Area Comms., supra note 36. 
 111. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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individualization, zero error rate, 100% certainty, and TTEOAOS are 
not uttered. 
The disappointment, however, extends beyond the latent print 
discipline. This is because the DOJ itself announced that the ULTRs 
“will serve as a model for demonstrating our commitment to 
strengthening forensic science, now and in the future.” 112  The 
approved latent print ULTR is the product of the entity which has 
now taken the place in American forensic science once occupied by 
the NCFS. It is among the first documents issued by that entity. As 
such, it may be a harbinger of what is to come in terms of the future 
of forensic science reform. In that context, the flaws in this 
document—its vagueness and ambiguity, its casual use of language, 
its self-contradiction, its continued perpetuation of claims to 
certainty, and its indifference to probability and uncertainty—may 
have implications for the future of forensic science reform far beyond 
a single document and a single discipline. 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Yates, supra note 7. 
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